La greffe du foie chez l'homme by Starzl, TE
Reprinted f lom ANNAIS OF I N T E R N A L  MEDICINE, Vo1. 67, No. 3, Part 11, September, 1967 
Printed in U. S. A. r . 
Discussion (ii) 
Permanency of moral values questioned-change of attitudes with time- 
social control of research-speeding u p  the law by educating the public- 
individuaf conscience in  research versus social control-extension of educa- 
tion to influence intelligence-hazards of drugs for intelligence--pay and 
insurance for experimental volunteers-doctrine of assumption of risk- 
social determinaton of the individual conscience-the researcher's social 
responsibilities-care for quality of human life, the permanent moral value 
-some wisdom from outside science-individual versus statistical morality, 
an artificial distinction-three permanent values-absolute versus absolute 
inferences-the application of traditional, immemorial morality-summing 
U P -  
D R. MCDERMOTT: hank you, Dr. Dubos. Would any members of the panel like 
to volunteer to start attacking the morals of 
each other or of our community? Prof. 
Medawar, do you have a question that you 
wish to ask? 
SIR PETER MEDAWAR: I would like to say, 
if I may, just by way of starting off the 
discussion, how very much I agree with 
Dr. Dubos's questioning the permanency of 
moral values. We tend to strike moral atti- 
tudes that are actually obsolete or are out 
of date in relation to what we actually be- 
lieve at the time. I'd like to give you an 
example of such a change of attitude. The 
question of the justifiability of abortion is 
not a scientific question, but it is a question 
to which scientific evidence is highly rele- 
vant, and, as the scientific evidence enlarges, 
so in fact do our opinions change. For 
example, a hundred years ago it would 
have been perfectly reasonable for a mar- 
ried couple to think that the child they 
conceived on any one occasion was a unique 
and necessary product of that occasion. 
That is to say, they would necessarily have 
the child they actually did have, if they 
had a child at all. And the child himself 
is apt to believe this automatically. A child 
does sometimes say, rather wonderingly, 
that if his mother and father had never 
chanced to meet and fall in love and 
marry then he himself would never have 
existed. He does, however, take it for 
granted that, as they did in fact meet and 
fall in love and marry, they necessarily had 
him-him uniquely and distinctively. One 
of the things that has changed is the reali- 
zation from Mendelian principles that the 
actual child conceived on any one occasion 
is one of a million possible children who 
might perfectly well have been conceived 
on that occasion if the luck of meeting of 
sperm and egg had been otherwise: So the 
child actually conceived by any one occa- 
sion is conceived as a matter of luck. Some- 
times it is cruelly bad luck: A phenylketo- 
nuric (PKU) child may be born in the 25% 
of cases that would be expected if PKU 
heterozygotes marry. Why should we be vic- 
timized by this process of luck? We now 
have a new understanding of the process of 
conception and the way in which luck 
enters into it. Why should we regard our- 
selves as morally bound by the laws of 
chance to put up with the birth, let us 
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say, of a monstrous child if there were some 
humane and sensible way of preventing 
such a thing occurring? Our attitudes have 
changed. 
PROF. KRECH: I would like to speak to 
another of Dr. Dubos's comments. I wonder 
if we all realize how radical one of his sug- 
gestions is. It is to this effect: that the 
choice of our research problems-not only 
biomedical but all basic research-is no 
longer to be determined by the interests 
and preferences of the research worker 
alone. Rather, this choice is to be controlled 
by social needs, social priorities, or social 
values. And this, for many research workers, 
does represent a radical reorganization of 
thinking. I happen to agree with you, Dr. 
Dubos, so I am proud to be associated 
with you in this revolutionary position. But 
it is a revolutionary position and one to 
which I think researchers would object- 
vigorously and violently-raising against us 
the old standards of "freedom" of research. 
JUDGE BURGER: I have a feeling that the 
medical profession has had a tendency to 
overreact to some of the fears about law 
and lawyers and judges and juries. Admit- 
tedly, they have something of a problem 
as to juries because they are unpredictable. 
But the fact is that over the years, as was 
pointed out, our progress in the law is not 
so terribly glacial at that. I was perhaps 
overstating its slowness. But I also coun- 
tered by pointing to the changes in atti- 
tudes, and another one comes to mind. A 
hundred years ago the dissection of human 
bodies was forbidden in many places. That's 
all gone; it's part of mythology now. A de- 
cision of our court recently has made the 
world safe for the town drunk: He may no 
longer be arrested, because it is not a crime 
to be a chronic alcoholic. He has to be 
picked up and put away, but he cannot be 
prosecuted and put in jail. Probably in due 
course the same thing is going to happen 
with narcotics addiction. Only within the 
last 18 months Congress has passed an 
enormously significant piece of legisla- 
tion calling for the treatment-compulsory 
treatment to be sure-but treatment as an 
alternative to imprisonment, of narcotics 
addicts. All I intended to point out was 
that the law cannot lead these things. It 
can only respond. You must lead them, and 
you must take your case to the public, 
either directly or through articulate lay 
people who can argue your case for you. 
And when you do, I think the consensus 
of the people in this country will respond. 
Just as your medical research has had this 
fantastic rate of speed in the last 20 years 
more or less, you have forced the law to 
speed up. You have brought about swifter 
changes in public opinion; and public 
opinion, in turn, is what leads congress- 
men and senators to act. So I would not be 
disheartened, and I would think that the 
medical investigators perhaps should lose 
some of the fears they have about going 
ahead just so long as the medical profession 
is prepared to control and denounce the 
irresponsible investigator and the irrespon- 
sible kinds of things that occurred in some 
of the disasters that I mentioned. 
DR. LEDERBERG: At Dr. Krech's request, 
I will add a point to the one I was previ- 
ously going to make and will comment on 
what he said. I didn't take Dr. Krech's re- 
mark as implying a large degree of social 
control of research; he was appealing to the 
social conscience of the individual investi- 
gator that he, the investigator, perhaps pay 
more attention to the requirements of his 
community in whatever way he could find 
it within himself to do. And this I heartily 
applaud. If Dr. Krech was stating that he 
agreed with the principle of social control 
of research-which I think he was saying- 
I would want to express my vehement dis- 
approval. I would regard this as an utter 
disaster and one from exactly the point of 
view of attempting to reach the same aims 
that he has in mind. The implication that 
social control or any rigorous effort to re- 
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discipline research should be vested in regu- 
latory bodies such as the Councils of the 
National Institutes of Health would require 
a concentration of social wisdom in a few 
individuals in exactly the area where we 
can least expect it in terms of innovation 
and creativity.* No one else can possibly 
know what ideas I might have if I am left 
to the freedom of my own choice of investi- 
gation in an area whose social consequences 
are not yet apparent. In this matter I think 
there is an enormous distinction between 
an appeal to conscience and an imposition 
of control. (Applause.) I am beginning to 
wonder what was wrong in what I have 
said. 
I shared Dr. Krech's amusement in the 
parlor game "what if" as applied to the ex- 
pected appearance of chemical innovations 
in the development of intelligence. And by 
the way, I fully agreed both with his ex- 
pectations of the occurrence of a break- 
through in this area and with his statement 
of the time scale on which it is likely to 
occur (assuming that psychologists do learn 
some of the tricks of proper behavioral con- 
trol in the conduct of their experiments). 
My only riposte is that the change in avail- 
ability of higher education is a social ex- 
periment that I believe to be strictly analo- 
gous to what he suggests may come about 
with the availability of chemicals to in- 
fluence intelligence. Until rather recently, 
higher education was a resource open only 
to a strictly limited segment of the popula- 
tion-the economically affluent. Its avail- 
ability to a wider variety of social groups 
and different countries represents exactly 
the kind of experiment that he was postu- 
lating would come from the introduction 
of drugs that influence intellectual compe- 
tence. I am not greatly alarmed about any 
of the possible outcomes of either of these 
two experiments. I believe there should be 
* Since the Colloquium was held, Dr. Lederberg 
has accepted an appointment to the National Insti- 
tute of Mental Health Council. 
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the maximum availability of whatever re- 
sources we have that can augment man's 
most human attributes for the use of his 
own intelligence and cooperativeness with 
other individuals. 
There is a "what if," though, that we 
didn't raise concerning, particularly, some 
of the drugs that have already been investi- 
gated, namely, their hazards. It seems to me 
very unlikely that we are going to have it 
so easy that a chemical will be found that 
will improve intelligence and will have an 
unambiguously favorable effect or a neutral 
effect on every other aspect of human per- 
formance. In fact, there are some individ- 
uals in whom the very increase of intelli- 
gence represents a hazard, sometimes even 
to themselves. But that is not quite what 
I had in mind. I think any drug that has 
this kind of effect on the central nervous 
system will almost certainly have a risk at- 
tached to it for some individuals. We then 
face the nice question, Is an increase in 
humanity, a general increase in IQ, worth 
taking some risk with respect to the per- 
formance of this individual? 
I would like to make a general remark 
on the whole issue of medical experimen- 
tation. I think the law is properly alarmed 
at a situation where individuals face the 
risk of becoming "bamboozled" into giving 
up, without evidence of appropriate con- 
sideration, an important value, namely, 
their life or health. And this is why, of 
course, one has to be so touchy about in- 
formed consent because it seems unreason- 
able to expect that an uncompensated 
individual or an individual whose compen- 
sation is ambiguous will in fact respond so 
altruistically. The law is suspicious of al- 
truists and properly so. I have an answer 
that I think deserves to be explored. Then 
why don't we pay medical volunteers? Why 
don't we establish some level of compensa- 
tion for risks incurred in the same way 
that, to a degree, we pay firemen and police- 
men because of the risk they take on our 
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behalf in their hazardous occupations? T o  
a certain extent we grossly underpay them; 
we even pay our servicemen for the risks 
that they undertake on our behalf in mili- 
tary engagements. You may think that this 
would be an economic burden that we 
cannot afford to pay. But if we paid medi- 
cal volunteers at actuarially sound rates 
and if we bought insurance against the 
hazards that might accrue to them, this 
could only have a humane effect. I think 
we should consider the whole question of 
whether, if there has been an ample ex- 
change of information between the physi- 
cian or the hospital and the subject of 
research, we would not have a much better 
precedent and an understanding that a fair 
contract had been made. I would like to 
open this question for legal and lay con- 
sideration. 
JUDGE BURGER: There is historical prece- 
dent, as I suggested earlier; for lawyers, you 
know, can always find precedents for some- 
thing cushioning the unhappy consequences 
of medical research. A couple of hundred 
years ago people who worked in the mills and 
the mines were subject to what was called 
the "doctrine of assumption of risk." They 
took the risk, and if they got killed or 
maimed, they were on their own and often 
went to the county poorhouse whether it 
was in England or in early America. Dr. 
Lederberg has suggested money payment 
for taking the risk. Perhaps this should not 
be compensation in terms of paying a sub- 
ject for undergoing the experiment but 
rather in terms of providing a broad-based 
fund, financed in any one of a dozen ways 
and geared to the NIH grants for medical 
research, by which the victim of the un- 
successful experiment-the person who is 
maimed or injured or killed-is covered 
just as is a coal miner or another workman 
who is paid a compensation when he is 
injured, without reference to negligence. 
This would take this whole area of experi- 
mental medicine out of the realm of negli- 
gence and malpractice. This is a possibility 
that some of your fertile-minded medico- 
legal people might do well to think about. 
PROF. KRECH: In the first place, we do 
have a precedent. We have a fund now, 
do we not, for the victims of a poor experi- 
ment-our economic society; this fund is 
called "social security." But that is not what 
I really wanted to discuss. I want to go 
back to Dr. Lederberg and his unhappiness 
at the applause he drew. I think I know, 
Dr. Lederberg, what was wrong with your 
statement that drew the applause. It was 
your easy distinction (which I find very dif- 
ficult or impossible to make) between "so- 
cial control" and "individual consciet~ce." 
I think that there is nothing so socially 
determined as a man's private conscience. 
Now, one speaks of the doctor's "personal" 
conscience and his attitude towards his pa- 
tient. But these very attitudes and ethics 
were built up from the doctor's very first 
day of medical school. He was taught what 
were the "correct" attitudes. The doctor's 
"individual conscience" was very much so- 
cially shaped and is very much socially 
controlled. There are various ways of so- 
cially controlling the basic researcher also. 
What do we teach our research people? Do 
we teach them to seek truth for its own 
sake and to pay no attention to the effects 
of our research on society? Do we teach 
them that society will somehow take care 
of the effects and that it is none of the scien- 
tist's business anyway? He must merely dis- 
cover the truth? If we teach that, then we 
are inducing one set of social attitudes or 
personal conscience or "scientific ethics." 
But this is a set of attitudes that I find, at 
this stage of the game, to be medieval at 
best. Another position would be deliber- 
ately to teach the basic researcher that when 
he goes into the laboratory he continues to 
carry with him all of his social responsibili- 
ties. When he takes off his "civilian" coat 
and puts on a laboratory coat he does not 
shed these responsibilities. If we taught him 
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this, as deliberately as the medical student 
is taught his ethics, we would produce sci- 
entists with a different (and in my opinion, 
a better) set of "personal" values. That is 
one form of using social control-inducing 
the proper attitudes. Let me now mention 
another kind of social control. We all apply 
for money from the federal agencies. Money 
has been the greatest invention for the pro- 
motion of research in the last 30 or 40 
years-government money. And who gets 
the government money? Obviously someone 
makes decisions about that, and his deci- 
sions are not based purely on chance. This 
is another area of social control that has 
been made without much thought. Perhaps 
we should do some thinking about this 
form of social control, too. But in any 
event, Dr. Lederberg, I fail to see the dis- 
tinction between "an appeal to conscience" 
and an "imposition of social controlo-a 
distinction that, when you merely stated 
it, brought down the house with approving 
applause. 
DR. ELKINTON: I can't quite let Sir Peter 
and Dr. Dubos go unchallenged over their 
delineation of moral standards as shifting 
sands without making a comment. And 
I think that this comment applies both to 
individual morality and to social morality. 
It seems to me that what we have been 
talking about, and what we all are inter- 
ested in, is enhancing the potential quality 
of human life. This is so whether we are 
talking about the human life of one experi- 
mental subject or one patient or a whole 
population. Perhaps we have acquired some 
wisdom down through the ages from out- 
side the boundaries of science-wisdom as 
to what constitutes, and what kind of action 
leads to, goodness, truth, and beauty in 
human life. At the core of this wisdom lies 
the general concept that to care for oneself 
alone is not as likely to enhance the quality 
of one's own life as is activity directed out- 
side oneself, that is, care and consideration 
for the quality of life of others. These are 
moral insights that we tend to look on as 
old-fashioned but that I think we cannot 
write off entirely. Let us realize that, as 
our knowledge and insights accumulate in 
both science and the humanities, we should 
be much better able to predict what actions 
on our part, as individuals or as a society, 
are going to affect the quality of life of 
that as yet unborn fetus or of that over- 
expanding population in an underprivi- 
leged country. I do believe that there is an 
absolute common denominator underlying 
our moral judgments, namely, concern for 
the quality and dignity of human life. 
PROF. STUMPF: In that connection I want 
to comment on the distinction that Dr. 
Dubos made between individual morality 
on the one hand and statistical morality on 
the other. I think I saw the spirit in which 
he said this, but I genuinely feel that this 
is an artificial distinction because, in the 
last analysis, when you talk about the great- 
est good for the greatest number, you are 
still left with the question, In the name 
of what is this called a good for anyone? 
It has to be defined as a good for someone 
in order to be a good for many. I am 
sure you recall that this was a nineteenth 
century philosophy that was worked out 
mathematically by Jeremy Bentham and 
later on by John Stuart Mill. This is the utili- 
tarian philosophy, and it usually is stated 
in terms of the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number. Then you have to define 
what you really mean by happiness. So 
finally you are driven back to some inter- 
pretation of what it means to be a human 
being and what is good for each individual. 
And in this sense I have some concern 
with your stating that probably we should 
have had a theologian speaking here today 
and at the same time saying there are no 
moral absolutes. This in itself is rather an in- 
teresting combination of ideas primarily be- 
cause I think that we are not all that much 
in the dark regarding morality, whether it 
be individual or social. 
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My comments are pade on the assumption 
that there are at least three virtually univer- 
sal and permanent values. The first major 
value is truth telling and, with it, every- 
thing that is involved with respect to what 
we think of another person. I remind you 
that the possibility of a lie depends on giv- 
ing the impression that you are telling the 
truth. It's a rather interesting point-you 
can't lie unless you affirm the value of 
truth. The second permanent value is ex- 
pressed in the saying that we ought not to 
willfully injure someone; the third is that 
we should not take what is another man's. 
And this, of course, is especially pertinent 
to our discussion here today, for what be- 
longs to a person more than himself-his 
body and his consciousness? 
I want to underscore your comment- 
which bears on many other comments here 
-that medicine is not autonomous. This is 
the moral point I would want to make. I 
think the drift of the discussion, the drift 
of your comments particularly as well as 
of mine, is that science will not generate 
its own values, that somehow we have to 
bring to them the consciousness and de- 
liberate power of the human mind. I feel 
much happier in dealing with simple moral 
insights than with a system for the reason 
that you mentioned, namely, that there is 
a shifting complexion to our problem as 
we get more information. I take it that one 
of the reasons for the Vatican Council is 
to discover ways of getting out of the box 
formed by absolutes, or getting out of a 
commitment to a certain formulation of an 
absolute. I believe in some absolutes and 
I think you do too, but I think that what 
we feel uncomfortable with are absolute 
inferences from these absolutes. 
SIR PETER MEDAWAR: I wanted to make 
a comment on Dr. Elkinton's point: his 
warning that we must not make too much 
of the changing standards of morality. Cer- 
tainly we cannot neglect what one might 
call traditional, immemorial wisdom. I do 
indeed agree with him. I think we ought 
to remember traditional wisdom more often 
than we do when we strike moral attitudes 
about problems like the problem of abor- 
tion. The fact is, we do treat the fetus 
quite differently from the way we treat the 
newborn child. For we don't in fact bap- 
tize miscarriages; we don't in fact hold fu- 
neral services for them. We do not regard 
every menstruation as a culpable depriva- 
tion of human life. I think that over mat- 
ters like this we should revert to a tradi- 
tional and common-sense morality that does 
in fact make a distinction between the fetus 
-particularly the early fetus-and the new- 
born child. 
DR. MCDERMOTT: I shall now proceed to 
close. Interestingly enough, particularly in 
this last three quarters of an hour, there 
has been a very constant thread running 
through the discussion to the effect, first, 
that morals are a reflection of culture, that 
culture is in constant evolution, that one 
cannot have laws until the attitudes of the 
society are there to back up the laws, and 
that there is something called a public good. 
Whether that public good is no more than 
the sum of the individuals "goods" is a 
point that Prof. Stumpf and I could hire 
a hall and debate. But this is obviously a 
public good of some sort for, if there are 
no social priorities, there is no ethical justi- 
fication for clinical investigation or other 
biomedical research that conceivably might 
put an individual at risk. So much for this 
common thread. But above all, I return to 
a comment made by Prof. Lederberg at the 
beginning that struck me as being really the 
text of our Colloquium today. His phrase, 
"known the pain of the consequences of his 
actions," is the text that is running through 
everything that everyone has been speaking 
about. And our problem is that today we 
are so very much more able to see this 
linkage between our actions and their con- 
sequences that we can never really free our- 
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selves from anguish whether we act or DR. WRIGHT: On behalf of the American 
choose not to act. I am convinced that it is College of Physicians I should like to ex- 
this that has given rise to this extraordi- tend our deep gratitude to those who have 
narily fine presentation this morning for contributed so generously to this remarka- 
which, on behalf of us all, I wish to thank ble intellectual experience. Thank you all 
the participants very much. very much. 
